ConTExT: Leakage-Free Transient Execution by Schwarz, Michael et al.
ConTExT: Leakage-Free Transient Execution
Michael Schwarz
Graz University of Technology
michael.schwarz@iaik.tugraz.at
Robert Schilling
Graz University of Technology
robert.schilling@iaik.tugraz.at
Florian Kargl
Graz University of Technology
florian.kargl@student.tugraz.at
Moritz Lipp
Graz University of Technology
moritz.lipp@iaik.tugraz.at
Claudio Canella
Graz University of Technology
claudio.canella@iaik.tugraz.at
Daniel Gruss
Graz University of Technology
daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
ABSTRACT
Out-of-order execution and speculative execution are among the
biggest contributors to performance and efficiency of modern pro-
cessors. However, they are inconsiderate, leaking secret data during
the transient execution of instructions. Many solutions have been
proposed against transient execution attacks. However, they do not
eliminate the leakage entirely or introduce unacceptable perfor-
mance penalties.
In this paper, we propose ConTExT, a Considerate Transient
Execution Technique. The basic idea of ConTExT is that secrets
can enter registers, but not transiently leave them. ConTExT
transforms Spectre from a problem that cannot be solved purely in
software [53], to a problem that is not easy to solve, but solvable
in software. For this, ConTExT requires minimal modifications of
applications, compilers, operating systems, and the hardware. Con-
TExT offers full protection for secrets in memory and secrets in reg-
isters. We evaluate the security and performance of ConTExT. With
its principled approach it inherently mitigates the recently found
microarchitectural data sampling attacks on small processor buffers.
Even when over-approximating, we observe no performance over-
head for unprotected code and data, and an overhead of 71.14 %
for security-critical applications, which is below the overhead of
currently recommended state-of-the-art mitigation strategies. The
actual overhead of ConTExT is below 1 % for real-world workloads.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Systems security; Operating sys-
tems security.
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1 INTRODUCTION
As arbitrary shrinking of process technology and increasing pro-
cessor clock frequencies is not possible due to physical limitations,
performance improvements in modern processors are made by
increasing the number of cores or by optimizing the instruction
pipeline. Out-of-order execution and speculative execution are
among the biggest contributors to the performance and efficiency
of modern processors. Out-of-order execution allows processing
instructions in an order deviating from the one specified in the
instruction stream. To fully utilize out-of-order execution, proces-
sors use prediction mechanisms, e.g., for branch directions and
targets. This predicted control flow is commonly called specula-
tive execution. However, predictions might be wrong, and virtually
any instruction can raise a fault, e.g., a page fault. Hence, in this
case, already executed instructions have to be unrolled, and their
results have to be discarded. Such instructions are called transient
instructions [37, 47, 79, 84].
Transient instructions are never committed, i.e., they are never
visible on the architectural level. Until the discovery of transient-
execution attacks, e.g., Spectre [37], Meltdown [47], and Foresha-
dow [79, 84], they were not considered a security problem. These
attacks exploit transient execution, i.e., execution of transient in-
structions, to leak secrets. This is accomplished by accessing secrets
in the transient-execution domain and transmitting them via a mi-
croarchitectural covert channel to the architectural domain.
The original Spectre attack [37] used a cache covert channel
to transmit data from the transient-execution domain to the ar-
chitectural domain. However, other covert channels can be used,
e.g., instruction timings [37, 69], register contention [37], branch-
predictor state [17], or the TLB [36, 69]. For other covert chan-
nels [15, 19, 23, 24, 32, 48, 52, 61, 68, 85–87], it is still unclear whether
they can be used.
Several countermeasures have been proposed against transient-
execution attacks, often relying on software workarounds. How-
ever, many countermeasures [2, 28, 34, 35, 88] only try to pre-
vent the cache covert channel of the original Spectre paper [37].
This includes the officially suggested workaround from Intel and
AMD [2, 28] to prevent Spectre variant 1 exploitation. However,
Schwarz et al. [69] showed that this is insufficient.
State-of-the-art countermeasures can be categorized into 3 classes
based on how they try to stop leakage [8, 55]:
(1) Mitigating or reducing the accuracy of the covert channel
communication, e.g., eliminating the covert channel or mak-
ing gadgets unreachable [34, 35, 88].
(2) Aborting or preventing transient execution when accessing
secrets [2, 4, 9, 28, 29, 58, 60, 78].
(3) Ensuring that secret data is unreachable [21, 64, 75].
In this paper, we introduce a new type of countermeasure. Our
approach, ConTExT, precisely prevents secret data from being used
in the transient-execution domain without aborting or preventing
transient execution. Architecturally, the secret data is still reachable.
However, the secret data is not available when executing in the
transient-execution domain. We show that our approach is efficient
and still runs non-dependent instructions out-of-order or specula-
tively. Moreover, we show that our approach effectively prevents
all Spectre attacks, but also very recent microarchitectural data
sampling attacks [56, 66, 67, 80].
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Implementing ConTExT in CPUs only requires repurposing one
page-table entry bit (e.g., one of the currently unused ones) as
a non-transient bit. Instead of the actual value, the CPU uses a
dummy value (e.g., ‘0’) when accessing a non-transient memory
location during transient execution. Additionally, to protect register
contents as well, we also introduce a non-transient bit per register.
Same as for the memory locations, the CPU will use a dummy value
during transient execution instead of the actual register content.
We annotate variables that can hold secrets in the source code.
With compiler and linker support, we propagate this information
into the binary, resulting in a separate binary section for secrets.
For this section, the operating system sets the memory mapping to
non-transient. We split the stack into an unprotected stack and a
transient stack. The unprotected stack is marked as non-transient to
be used as temporary memory by the compiler, e.g., register spills,
and local variables are moved to the transient stack. Thus, there is
no performance impact for local variables. Preventing leakage only
requires a developer to identify the assets, i.e., secret values, inside
an application. Obviously, this is much easier than identifying all
code locations which potentially leak secret values.
To emulate the minimal hardware adaptions ConTExT requires,
we over-approximate it via ConTExT-light, a software-only solu-
tion which partially emulates the behavior using existing features
of commodity CPUs. ConTExT-light relies on the property that
values stored in uncacheable memory can generally not be used
inside the transient-execution domain [14, 47], except for cases
where the value is architecturally in registers, or microarchitec-
turally in the load buffer, store buffer, or line fill buffer. It is an
over-approximation of ConTExT, yet, does not provide complete
protection on commodity systems due to leakage from these two
buffers. Thus, while it does not provide the same protection guar-
antees, it allows obtaining a loose upper bound for the worst-case
performance overhead of the hardware solution. ConTExT only re-
quires the annotation of secrets inside the program, it can be easily
added to any existing C/C++ program to protect secrets from being
leaked via transient-execution attacks. In contrast to the software
approximation ConTExT-light, ConTExT also inherently protects
against microarchitectural data sampling attacks [56, 66, 67, 80], as
leakage is, by design, prevented on the register-level and the state
of caches and buffers does not matter.
We evaluate the security of ConTExT on all known Spectre at-
tacks. Due to its principled design, ConTExT prevents the leakage
of secret data in all cases. The overhead is less than 71.14 %, which
is lower than the overhead of the currently recommended and de-
ployed countermeasures [2, 4, 9, 28, 41, 60, 64, 75, 76]. To further
support the performance analysis, we extended the Bochs emulator
with the non-transient bits for registers and page tables and ex-
tended it with a cache simulator. With the hardware extension, the
overhead of ConTExT is below 1 % for most real-world workloads.
Concurrent to ourwork, NVIDIA patented a closely related to our
design [7]. However, they do not provide protection for registers,
but only for memory locations.
Contributions. The contributions of this work are:
(1) We propose ConTExT, a hardware-software co-design for
considerate transient execution, fully mitigating transient-
execution attacks.
(2) We show that on all levels only minimal changes are nec-
essary. The proposed hardware changes can be partially
emulated on commodity hardware.
(3) We demonstrate that ConTExT prevents all known Spectre
variants, even if they do not rely on the cache for the covert
channel.
(4) We evaluate the performance of ConTExT and show that
the overhead is lower than the overhead of state-of-the-art
countermeasures.
Outline. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we provide background information. Section 3 presents
the design of ConTExT. Section 4 details our approximate proof-of-
concept implementation on commodity hardware. Section 5 pro-
vides security and performance evaluations. Section 6 discusses the
context of our work. We conclude our work in Section 7.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we give an overview of transient execution. We
then discuss known transient execution attacks. We also discuss
proposed defenses and their shortcomings.
2.1 Transient Execution
To simplify processor design and to allow superscalar processor
optimizations, modern processors first decode instructions into
simpler micro-operations (µOPs) [18]. With these µOPs, one opti-
mization is not to execute them in-order as given by the instruction
stream but to execute them out-of-order as soon as the execution
unit and required operands are available. Even in the case of out-
of-order execution, instructions are retired in the order specified
by the instruction stream. This necessitates a buffer, called reorder
buffer, where intermediate results from µOPs can be stored until
they can be retired as intended by the instruction stream.
In general, software is almost never purely linear but contains
(conditional) branches. Without speculative execution, a processor
would have to wait until the branch is resolved before execution
can be continued, drastically reducing performance. To increase
performance, speculative execution allows a processor to predict
the most likely outcome of the branch using various predictors and
continue executing along that direction until the branch is resolved.
At runtime, a program has different ways to branch, e.g., condi-
tional branches or indirect calls. Intel provides several structures to
predict branches [27], e.g., Branch History Buffer (BHB) [6], Branch
Target Buffer (BTB) [16, 45], the Pattern History Table (PHT) [18],
and Return Stack Buffer (RSB) [18, 39, 51]. On multi-core CPUs,
Ge et al. [19] have shown that the branch prediction logic is not
shared among physical cores, preventing one physical core from
influencing the prediction on another.
Speculation is not limited to branches. Processors can, e.g., spec-
ulate on the existence of data dependencies [25]. In the case where
the prediction was correct, the instructions in the reorder buffer
are retired in-order. If the prediction was wrong, the results are
squashed, and a rollback is performed by flushing the pipeline and
the reorder buffer. During that process, all architectural but no
microarchitectural changes are reverted. Any instruction getting
executed out-of-order or speculatively but not architecturally is
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called a transient instruction. Transient execution may have measur-
able microarchitectural side effects.
2.2 Transient Execution Attacks & Defenses
While transient execution does not influence the architectural state,
the microarchitectural state can change. Attacks that exploit these
microarchitectural state changes to extract sensitive information
are called transient execution attacks. So-called Spectre-type [37]
attacks exploit different prediction mechanisms, while Meltdown-
type [47, 79] attacks exploit transient execution following a CPU
exception.
Kocher et al. [37] first introduced two variants of Spectre attacks.
The first exploits the PHT and the BHB such that the processor
mispredicts the code path following a conditional branch. If the
transiently executed code loads and leaks the secret, it is called
a Spectre gadget. Kiriansky and Waldspurger [36] extended this
attack from loads to stores, enabling transient buffer overflows and,
thus, extending the number of possible Spectre gadgets.
Variant 2 [37] targets indirect branches and poisons the BTB
with attacker-chosen destinations, leading to transient execution of
the code at this attacker-chosen destination. An attacker mistrains
the processor by performing indirect branches within the attacker’s
own address space to the address of the chosen address, regardless
of what resides at this location. Chen et al. [10] showed that this
can also be exploited in SGX.
For a memory load, the processor checks the store buffer for
stored values to this memory location. Variant 4 [25], Speculative
Store Bypass, exploits when the processor transiently uses a stale
value because it could not find the updated value in the store buffer,
e.g., due to aliasing.
SpectreRSB [39] and ret2spec [51] are Spectre variants targeting
the RSB, a small hardware stack of recent return addresses pushed
during recent call instructions. When a ret is executed, the top of
the RSB is used to predict the return address. An attacker can force
misspeculation in various ways, e.g., by overfilling the RSB, or by
overwriting the return address on the software stack.
All of the attacks discussed above have three things in common.
First, they all use transient execution to access data that they would
not access in normal, considerate execution. Second, they use this
data to influence the microarchitectural state which can be observed
using microarchitectural attacks, e.g., Flush+Reload [89]. Third, all
are executed locally on the victimmachine, requiring the attacker to
run code on the machine. Schwarz et al. [69] extended the original
Spectre attack with a remote component and demonstrated that
the microarchitectural state of the AVX2 unit can be used instead
of the cache state to leak data.
Meltdown-type attacks exploit deferred handling of exceptions
and do not exploit misspeculation but use other techniques to exe-
cute instructions transiently. Between the occurrence of an excep-
tion and it being raised, instructions can be executed transiently
that access data retrieved by the faulting instructions. The original
Meltdown attack [47] exploited the deferred pagefault following
a user/supervisor bit violation, allowing to leak arbitrary mem-
ory. A variation of this attack allows an attacker to read system
registers [4, 28]. Van Bulck et al. [79, 84] demonstrated that this
problem also applies to other page-table bits, namely the present
and the reserved bits. Canella et al. Canella2019 analyzed different
exception types, based on Intel’s [26] classification of exceptions
as faults, traps, and aborts. They found that all known Meltdown
variants so far have exploited faults, but not traps or aborts.
Defenses. Since the discovery of Spectre, many different defenses
have been proposed. The easiest and most radical solution would be
to entirely (or selectively) disable speculation at the cost of a huge
decrease in performance [37]. Intel and AMD proposed a similar
solution by using serializing instructions on both outcomes of a
branch [2, 28]. Evtyushkin et al. [17] proposed to allow a developer
to annotate branches that could leak sensitive data, which are then
not predicted. Unfortunately, on Intel CPUs, serializing branches
does not prevent microarchitectural effects such as powering up
AVX units, or TLB fills [69].
For mitigating the RSB attack vector, Intel proposes RSB stuff-
ing [29]. Upon each context switch, the RSB is filled with the address
of a benign gadget.
Google Chrome limits the amount of data that can be extracted
by introducing site isolation [75]. Site isolation relies on process
isolation, i.e., each site is executed in its own process. Thus, Spectre
attacks cannot leak secrets of other sites. Speculative Load Harden-
ing [9] and YSNB [58] are similar proposals, both limiting specu-
lation by introducing data dependencies between the array access
and the condition.
SafeSpec [34] and InvisiSpec [88] introduce additional shadow
hardware for speculation. The results of transient instructions are
only made visible to the actual hardware when the processor deter-
mined that the prediction was correct. Both methods require major
changes to the hardware.
DAWG [35] is another proposal requiringmajor hardware changes.
The idea is to partition the cache to create protection domains
which are disjoint across ways and metadata partitions. Addition-
ally to hardware changes, the approach requires changes to the
replacement policy and cache coherence protocol to incorporate
the protection domain.
All local Spectre variants so far use either Flush+Reload [25, 37,
39, 51, 89] or Prime+Probe [59, 77] to extract information from the
covert channel, requiring access to a high-resolution timer. Thus, a
defense mechanism is to reduce the accuracy of timers [54, 62, 74,
82] and eliminate methods to construct different timers [68].
To mitigate Spectre variant 2, both Intel and AMD extended the
ISA with mechanisms to control indirect branches [3, 30], namely
Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS), Single Thread In-
direct Branch Prediction (STIBP), and Indirect Branch Predictor
Barrier (IBPB). With IBRS, the processor enters a special mode
and predictions cannot be influenced by operations outside of it.
STIBP restricts the sharing of branch predictionmechanisms among
hyperthreads. IBPB allows to flush the BTB. Future processors im-
plement enhanced IBRS [29], a hardware mitigation for Spectre
variant 2. With retpoline [78], Google proposes an alternative tech-
nique to protect against branch poisoning by ensuring that the
return instruction predicts to a benign endless loop through the
RSB.
To mitigate Spectre variant 4, Intel provides a microcode update
to disable the speculation on the store buffer check [30]. The new
feature, called Speculative Store Buffer Disable (SSBD), is also sup-
ported by AMD [1]. ARM introduced a new barrier (SSBB) which
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prevents loads after the barrier from bypassing a store using the
same virtual address before the barrier [4]. Future ARM CPUs will
feature a configuration control register that prevents the re-ordering
of stores and loads. This feature is called Speculative Store Bypass
Safe (SSBS) [4].
So far, all the proposed defense mechanisms against Spectre
attacks either require substantial hardware changes or only consider
cache-based covert channels. In the latter case, an attacker can
circumvent the defense by using a different covert channel. This
focus on cache covert channels only and the huge decrease in
performance caused by state-of-the-art Spectre defenses shows the
necessity for development of efficient and effective defenses.
To mitigate Meltdown, Gruss et al. [21] proposed KAISER, a ker-
nel modification unmapping most of the kernel space while running
in user mode [21]. The idea of KAISER has been integrated into all
major operating systems, e.g., in Linux as KPTI [50], in Windows
as KVA Shadow [31], and in Apple’s xnu kernel as double map [46].
With the PCID and ASID support of modern processors, the perfor-
mance overheads appear acceptable for real-world use cases [20].
Additionally, to mitigate Foreshadow [79] on SGX enclaves, mi-
crocode updates are necessary. To mitigate Foreshadow-NG [84],
several further steps need to be implemented for full mitigation.
The kernel must use non-present page-table entries more carefully,
e.g., not store the swap disk page frame number there for swapped-
out pages. When using EPTs (extended page tables), the hypervisor
must make sure that the L1 cache does not contain any secrets
when switching into a virtual machine. Hence, the defenses for
Meltdown are complete but expensive.
2.3 Taint Analysis
Taint tracking is used to track data-flow dependencies on a hard-
ware level [12, 72], binary-level [11, 65], or source level [70]. Taint
analysis has a wide range of security applications: detecting vulner-
abilities, e.g., by tracking untrusted user input; malware analysis,
e.g., analyzing information flows in binaries; test case generation,
e.g., automatically generating inputs. This can be either done stati-
cally [5, 83] or dynamically [57, 63].
Dynamic taint analysis allows to track the information flow
between sources and sinks [65]. Any value that depends on data
derived from a tainted source, e.g., user input, is considered tainted.
Values that are not derived from tainted sources are considered
untainted. A policy defines how taint flows as the program executes
and how new taints are introduced. Over-approximation can occur
when tainting a value that is not derived from a taint source.
Taint tracking has also been proposed on a hardware level [81],
yet not in the context of speculative execution.
3 DESIGN OF CONTEXT
In this section, we present the design of ConTExT, a considerate
transient execution technique.
The idea of ConTExT is to introduce a new type of memory
mappings, namely non-transient mappings. The non-transient op-
tion indicates that the mapping contains secrets which must not
be accessed within the transient-execution domain. Consequently,
non-transient values must not be used in transient operations, nei-
ther directly nor in a derived form. Thus, there cannot be any
perturbations of the microarchitectural CPU state which might
disclose non-transient values via side channels. To track whether a
value is non-transient and must be protected, registers also track the
non-transient state. To ensure not only the original but also derived
values are protected, this information is propagated to the results
of operations using these values, until the secret is destroyed, e.g.,
by overwriting it.
A processor with ConTExT mitigates all speculative execution
and microarchitectural data sampling attacks, as the processor can-
not use non-transient registers anymore. However, code that ex-
poses information architecturally already is considered out of scope,
e.g., branching based on secrets.
ConTExT is a multi-level countermeasure which works on the
application-, compiler-, operating-system-, and hardware-level. An
application developer annotates secret values in the source code,
which the compiler groups inside the binary and marks as secret.
Besides annotation of secrets it would also be possible to architec-
turally define groups of secrets, e.g., by defining all userspace mem-
ory and user input as secret as proposed by Taram et al. [73]. How-
ever, this can be very expensive, and consequently, related work is
also investigating annotation-based protection mechanisms [90].
When the operating system loads the binary, memory regions
containing the annotated secrets are marked non-transient. All sub-
sequent tracking of secrets is done by the hardware. The operating
system only has to be aware of secret register states on interrupts,
e.g., context switches. Other than these minimal changes, there are
no additional adaptions required on any level of the software stack.
The full protection ConTExT requires small hardware changes,
which retrofits mechanisms which already exist in today’s CPUs,
i.e., there is no re-design required. Moreover, the change is fully
backwards compatible with existing hardware and software (i.e., ap-
plications, libraries, and operating systems). As hardware changes
cannot be conducted on commodity CPUs, we evaluate ConTExT
based on ConTExT-light, an over-approximation which only re-
quires software changes. As illustrated in Figure 1, ConTExT is a
more considerate variant of transient execution.
ConTExT protects secrets which are stored in cache and DRAM,
i.e., attackers cannot access data from memory locations marked
as non-transient during transient execution, and registers if they
have been filled with data from protected cache or DRAM locations
or other protected registers. ConTExT-light cannot protect secrets
while they are architecturally stored in registers of running threads,
or microarchitecturally in the load buffer, store buffer, or in the line
fill buffer. With ConTExT-light, an attacker can still leak data from
these microarchitectural structures. We only use it to obtain a loose
upper bound for the performance overheads of ConTExT.
ConTExT is a multi-level countermeasure consisting of 3 major
components which we describe in this section:
(1) non-transient memory mappings (cf. Section 3.1),
(2) tracking of non-transient data (cf. Section 3.2), and
(3) software (i.e., OS, compiler, and application) support for the
hardware features (cf. Section 3.3).
3.1 Non-Transient Memory Mappings
We present three possible implementations of non-transient mem-
orymappings, i.e., memorymappings which indicate that the values
ConTExT: Leakage-Free Transient Execution
Serializing Barrier
no
te
xe
cu
te
d1
cmp rdi, .array_len
jbe .else
lfence
st
al
lmov (rax + rdi),al
shl 12,rax
and 0xff000,eax
mov (rdx + rax),al
mov 0,rax
retq
mov rax,(rsp + 8)
ConTExT-light
no
te
xe
cu
te
d1
cmp rdi, .array_len
jbe .else
mov (rax + rdi),al
shl 12,rax
and 0xff000,eax
mov (rdx + rax),al
mov 0,rax
retq
mov rax,(rsp + 8)
ConTExT
no
te
xe
cu
te
d
cmp rdi, .array_len
jbe .else
mov (rax + rdi),al
shl 12,rax
and 0xff000,eax
mov (rdx + rax),al
mov 0,rax
retq
mov rax,(rsp + 8)
Unprotected
cmp rdi, .array_len
jbe .else
mov (rax + rdi),al
shl 12,rax
and 0xff000,eax
mov (rdx + rax),al
mov 0,rax
retq
mov rax,(rsp + 8)
Figure 1: Comparison of ConTExTwith the currently recommended solution against the first Spectre attack example [38]. The
leaking access, i.e., the only line thatmust not be executed, is highlighted. Serializing barriers and ConTExT-light only provide
incomplete protection (1), as parts of the instructions may still be executed if the values are only retrieved from registers, load
buffer, store buffer, or line fill buffer.
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Figure 2: A page-table entry on x86-64 consists of 64 bits
which define properties of the virtual-to-physical memory
mapping. Besides the already used bits, physical page num-
ber, and ignored bits (which can be freely used), there are 6
physical address bits which are currently reserved for future
use since hardware is limited to 46-bit physical addresses.
Future processors may support longer physical addresses.
cannot be used during transient execution.1 All variants allow inte-
grating ConTExT into the current architecture while maintaining
backwards compatibility, i.e., if the operating system is not aware
of ConTExT, the changes have no side effects. Hence, to implement
ConTExT only one of the following variants has to be implemented.
Currently Reserved Page-Table Entry Bit. There is already
sufficient space to store the non-transient bit in the page tables of
commodity CPUs. On Intel 64-bit (IA-32e) systems, each page-table
entry has 64 bits, but the defined maximum physical address only
has 52 bits. However, most processors do not support full 52 bits,
but only up to 46 bits, which allows working with up to 64 TB of
physical RAM if the hardware supported it.
Figure 2 shows a page-table entry for x86-64. Besides the already
used bits, there are the 6 bits between bit 46 and 51, which are
currently reserved for future use. This future use could be the
extension of the physical page number if more physical memory
is supported in future CPU generations. However, it could also be
the repurposing of one of the bits (e.g., the last reserved bit) as a
1Concurrent to our work, NVIDIA patented a closely related to our design [7]. However,
they do not provide protection for registers, but only for memory locations.
non-transient bit. This reduces the theoretical maximum amount
of supported memory by factor 2. Thus, instead of 4 PB, CPUs
could only support 2 PB of physical memory. The repurposing of a
reserved bit is automatically backwards-compatible, as the reserved
bits currently have to be ‘0’. Hence, using such a bit does not have
any undesirable side effects on legacy software.
Currently Ignored Page-Table Entry Bit and Control Regis-
ter. An alternative to using one of the reserved bits is to use one
of the ignored bits. These bits can be freely used by the operating
system, thus, simply repurposing them is not possible. However,
if the feature has to be actively enabled, the operating system is
aware of the changed semantics of the specific ignored bit. Note
that this approach was already taken for several other page-table
bits, e.g., the protection key and the global bit are enabled via CR4
and they are ignored otherwise. Hence, we also propose enabling
the feature using a bit in one of the CPU control registers, e.g.,
CR4, EFER, or XCR0. These registers are already used for enabling
and disabling security-related features, such as NX (no-execute)
or SMAP (supervisor mode access prevention). Moreover, these
registers still have up to 54 unused control bits which can be used
to enable and disable the non-transient bit.
An advantage of repurposing an ignored bit is that CPU vendors
do not lose potential address space bits. That is, this approach is
compatible with physical address spaces of up to 4 PB in future
hardware. However, the approach comes with the limitation that
operating systems cannot freely use the retrofitted ignored bit
anymore, as it is now used as the non-transient bit.
Memory Type using Page-Attribute Table. A third alternative
is to retrofit the Page-Attribute Table (PAT), a processor feature
allowing the operating system to reconfigure various attributes for
classes of pages. The PAT allows specifying the memory type of a
memory mapping. On x86, there are currently 6 different memory
types which define the cache policy of the memory mapping.
Table 1 shows the memory types which can be set using the
PAT, including our newly proposed non-transient memory type.
The PAT itself provides 8 entries for memory types. Such a PAT
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Value Type Description
0 UC Strong uncacheable, never cached
1 WC Write Combining (subsequent writes are com-
bined and written once)
2 NS Non-transient, cannot read in transient ex-
ecution domain
3 - Reserved
4 WT Write Through (reads cached, writes written to
cache and memory)
5 WP Write Protected (only reads are cached)
6 WB Write Back (reads/writes are cached)
7 UC- Uncacheable, overwritten by MTRR
Table 1: The currently supported memory types which can
be used in the PAT (Intel 64-bit systems), and the additional
non-transient type (bold-italic) as new memory type.
entry is applied to a memory mapping via the 3 page-table-entry
bits ‘3’ (write through), ‘4’ (uncacheable), and ‘7’ (PAT). These 3
bits combined to a 3-bit number select one of the 8 entries of the
PAT.
Thus, to apply the non-transient memory type to a memory
mapping, the OS sets one of the PAT entries to the non-transient
memory type ‘2’. Then, this PAT entry can be applied through
the existing page-table bits to any memory mapping. As the PAT
supports 8 entries, and there are currently only 6 memory types (7
if the non-transient type is included), it is still possible to use all
supported memory types concurrently on different pages, i.e., the
approach is fully backwards-compatible.
An advantage of this approach is that no semantic changes have
to be made to page-table entries, i.e., all bits in a page-table entry
keep their currentmeaning. However, this variantmay requiremore
changes in the operating system, as e.g., Linux already utilizes all
of the PAT entries (some memory types are defined twice).
3.2 Secret Tracking
Non-transient mappings ensure that non-transient memory loca-
tions cannot be accessed during transient execution. However, we
still need to protect secret data that is already loaded into a reg-
ister. Registers in commodity CPUs do not have a memory type
or protection. Thus, we require changes to the hardware to im-
plement protection of registers. Based on patents from Intel [33],
VMWare [44], and NVIDIA [7], we expect such tracking features
to be implemented in future CPUs. Venkataramani et al. [81] pro-
posed a technique that also taints registers, however, to mitigate
architecturally and functionally correct behavior rather than overly
eager speculative execution.
Tainting Registers. For ConTExT, we introduce one additional
non-transient bit per register, i.e., a taint (cf. Section 2.3). The non-
transient bit indicates whether the value stored in the register is
non-transient or not. A register is either entirely non-transient or
entirely not at all. The taint generally propagates from memory to
registers and from registers to registers. The rationale behind this
is that results of operations on secret data have to be considered
secret as well. Accessing only parts of a tainted register, e.g., eax
instead of rax, still copies the taint from the source register to the
target register and taints the entire target register, as we only have
a single non-transient bit per register. This is also true for taint
propagation in any other use of a tainted register.
We keep taint propagation very simple and consider only instruc-
tions with registers as destination operands. If any non-transient
memory location is used as a source operand to an instruction, the
instruction taints the destination registers, i.e., the non-transient bit
is set for every destination register. Similarly, if any non-transient
register is used as a source operand to an instruction, the instruc-
tion also taints the destination registers. Thus, if a secret is loaded
into a register, it is tracked through all register operations.
The taint is not propagated if the destination operand(s) are
memory location(s), as all memory locations already have a non-
transient bit managed by the operating system.
Untainting Registers. There are not only operations which taint
registers, but also operations which untaint registers. Replacing the
entire content of a register without using non-transient memory or
registers, untaints the register. We do this to avoid over-tainting
registers, a problem pointed out in earlier works [71]. In particular,
all immediate or untainted values which replace the content of a
register, untaint the register. Writing a tainted register to a nor-
mal memory location, i.e., a memory location which is not marked
as non-transient, also untaints the register. The rationale behind
this is that if registers are spilled to normal (i.e., insecure) memory
locations, a potential secret can be leaked anyway. If such a mem-
ory operation happens unintentionally, it is a bug in the program
and has to be fixed at the software level. In many cases, however,
this will be intentional behavior, as the programmer decided that
the register does not contain a secret anymore. For instance, the
output of a cryptographic cipher does not need protection from
transient execution attacks. Thus, the automated untainting keeps
the number of tainted registers small.
Taint Propagation across Memory Operations. As the taint
bit is an additional bit for each register, it can only be propagated
to other registers, not to memory. If an operation writes a secret
(i.e., tainted) register to the memory, the taint bit is irrecoverably
lost. While this is intended if the developer explicitly writes values
to memory, it might have undesirable consequences if this happens
implicitly, e.g., due to the inner workings of the compiler. In Sec-
tion 3.3, we introduce the required changes to the compiler which
ensure that non-transient values are never spilled to transient mem-
ory locations accidentally.
However, the compiler inevitably still has to temporarily store
(insecure) registers within memory regions marked as non-transient.
With the solution as described so far, we would over-approximate
and taint more and more registers over time by spilling them to
non-transient memory locations and reading them back from there.
Hence, spilling registers is not a security problem (i.e., tainted reg-
isters are never untainted, only untainted registers are tainted), but
a loss in performance due to unnecessarily tainted registers.
Optimizing Performance via Caching. To prevent this potential
performance loss, we propose an additional change to the cache to
reduce the impact of the taint over-approximation. We introduce
one additional bit per 64 bits to the cache, i.e., 8 additional bits
per 64 B cache line. This allows us to store the register-taint infor-
mation transparently in the cache. Whenever a register is written
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to non-transient memory, the taint bit of the register is stored in
the corresponding cache line. When reading from memory, the bit
stored in the cache line has precedence over the information from
the TLB, i.e., the cache overwrites the taint bit defined by the mem-
ory mapping. The information in the cache allows the hardware to
temporarily keep track of the taint information of a register if the
register value is moved to the stack. This happens, e.g., if register
values are spilled on the stack, exchanged via the stack, or upon
function calls.
Evicting the cache line corresponding to a register is never a
security issue. An evicted cache line only loses the information
that a register was not tainted. Thus, if the cache line is evicted, the
registers become automatically tainted.
3.2.1 Taint Control. Besides the automated tainting and untainting
of registers, ConTExT provides a privileged interface to modify
the taint of registers. This interface is necessary for the operating
system to save and restore taint values upon context switches.
A straightforward solution would be to introduce new instruc-
tions in the ISA. However, we try to keep the hardware changes
to a minimum, especially changes which are not hidden in the mi-
croarchitecture. Hence, we propose instead to use model-specific
registers (MSR) to access the taint information of registers.
Read/Write Taint. To read andwrite the current taint information
of all registers, we introduce an MSR IA32_TAINT. The taint bit of
every register directly maps to one bit of this MSR, which allows
the operating system to read and write all taint bits in a single
operation. As there are only 56 registers (16 general purpose, 8
floating point, 32 vector) which have to be tracked, one 64-bit MSR
is sufficient to read or write all taint bits at once.
Interrupt Handling. MSRs can only be accessed indirectly, using
an instruction (i.e., rdmsr on x86), and require registers both to
specify the MSR and as source and destination operands. On an
interrupt, the first thing to save should be the IA32_TAINT MSR,
because it contains the taints of the previous context. However,
as registers must not be clobbered in the interrupt routine, all the
registers used in the interrupt handler have to be saved first. We
resolve this problem by automatically copying the IA32_TAINT to
an additional MSR, IA32_SHADOW_TAINT, on every interrupt. This
ensures that the taint of all registers is preserved before any taint is
potentially modified by a register operation in the interrupt handler.
The IA32_SHADOW_TAINT can then be treated like any other register,
e.g., the operating system can save it into a kernel structure upon a
context switch.
When returning from an interrupt, the CPU restores the values
from IA32_SHADOW_TAINT to the register taint values. Hence, with
this mechanism, we ensure that an interrupt does not influence
the taint value of any register. This also works for the unlikely
event of nested interrupts, i.e., if an interrupt is interrupted by a
different interrupt. The only critical region in such a case is if the
first interrupt has not yet locally saved the IA32_SHADOW_TAINT
MSR, and the second interrupt overwrites the MSR. However, as
long as within this critical region (i.e., the time window between
first interrupt and second interrupt) no register is untainted, there
can be no leakage. In Section 3.3, we show that this situation can
be avoided solely in software.
3.3 Software Support
We propose changes to applications, compilers, and operating sys-
tems to leverage the hardware extensions introduced in Section 3.1
and Section 3.2. The idea is that application developers annotate
secrets in their applications. The annotations are processed by the
compiler and then forwarded to the operating system to establish
the correct memory mappings (cf. Section 3.1).
Compiler. The compiler parses the annotations of secrets. The
secrets identified this way are allocated inside a dedicated section
of the binary. The compiler marks this section as non-transient.
The operating system maps this section from the binary using a
non-transient memory mapping.
Besides parsing the annotations, our modified compiler ensures
that it never spills data from registers marked as secret into unpro-
tected memory. Otherwise, an attacker could leak the spilled secrets
from memory. Still, it is unavoidable that the compiler spills reg-
isters to memory, e.g., to preserve register contents over function
calls. Furthermore, due to the calling convention, some (possibly
secret) values have to be passed over the stack. Hence, we have to
assume that the stack contains secrets. As a consequence, the stack
has to be mapped using a non-transient memory mapping as well.
To reduce the performance impact of a non-transient stack, we
modify the compiler to only use the non-transient stack if really
necessary. This non-transient stack only contains register spills,
possibly function arguments, and return values. All other values
are stored at a different memory location, the unprotected stack.
This concept is similar to the SafeStack [40] and our implementa-
tion even reuses parts of the SafeStack infrastructure of modern
compilers. The difference to SafeStack, where only “unsafe” mem-
ory allocations (e.g., buffers) are stored on the SafeStack, is that
we move all variables normally allocated on the stack to the un-
protected stack. Thus, for ConTExT, only the absolute minimum is
stored on the non-transient stack, e.g., return addresses. By only
moving local variables to the unprotected stack, and leaving return
addresses and function arguments on the stack, we do not break ABI
compatibility with existing binaries. Thus, a developer can still use
external libraries without recompiling them, and libraries compiled
for ConTExT can be used in ordinary unprotected applications.
Moving local variables from the stack to a different memory
location does not impact the runtime of the application and even
gives additional protection against memory-corruption attacks [40].
Operating System. For ConTExT, the operating system is in charge
of setting up non-transient memory mappings. As the operating
system parses the binary, it can directly set up the non-transient
memory mappings which are marked as such by the compiler. The
operating system requires additional small changes. The operating
system has to save and restore taint values on context switches. The
hardware already saves the current taint value of all registers into
the IA32_SHADOW_TAINTMSR upon interrupts. Thus, the operating
system only has to read this register and save it together with all
other saved registers.
As interrupts can be interrupted by other interrupts, e.g., a
normal interrupt can be interrupted by a non-maskable interrupt
(NMI), there is a critical section between reading the MSR and sav-
ing the result. If registers are untainted in this section, a nested
interrupt would lose the taint information as it overwrites the
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1 pushall
2 rep xor rcx, rcx ; clear rcx, rep prefix keeps taint
3 add rcx, IA32_TAINT
4 rdmsr ; taint in rax, rdx
5 [...]
6 popall
7 push rax, rcx, rdx
8 mov rcx, IA32_TAINT ; also updates IA32_SHADOW_TAINT
9 wrmsr ; old taint in rax, rdx
10 pop rax, rcx, rdx
11 iret ; restores IA32_SHADOW_TAINT to registers
Listing 1: (Pseudo-)assembly for saving and restoring the
taint MSR without destroying the taint of any other regis-
ter during a context switch.
IA32_SHADOW_TAINT MSR. However, if registers are not untainted
in this section, no taint information can be lost. Hence, we have
to initialize the registers required to read the MSR in a way which
does not destroy the taint. For this purpose, we define that the rep
prefix for arithmetic and logical operations on registers, preserves
the taint. Section 3.3 shows (pseudo-)assembly code which prepares
the registers with the required immediate values. Generally, over-
writing a register with an immediate or by using an idiom, e.g., e.g.,
xor rax,rax, generally untaints the register. However, the rep
prefix prevents the untainting here.
In addition to the context switch, the operating system has to
flush the cache when the content of a non-transient memory is
initially loaded from the binary. This is important as the initial data
transfer to the memory page is not done through the non-transient
user-space mapping. Thus, the operating system has to either dis-
able the cache before this operation or flush the corresponding
cache lines afterwards. This functionality is already present in the
x86 ISA and supported by modern operating systems, thus, there is
no further change required.
4 IMPLEMENTATION OF CONTEXT
In this section, we present our implementation of both ConTExT
and ConTExT-light, which we use for the evaluation (cf. Section 5).
As we cannot change real x86 hardware or emulate the hardware
changes required for ConTExT on commodity hardware, we opted
for a hardware simulation of our changes using a full-system emu-
lator (cf. Section 4.1). While this does not allow to measure perfor-
mance by measuring the runtime, it allows measuring performance
in the number of memory accesses, non-transient memory accesses,
taint over-approximations, etc., for real-world benchmarks.
For ConTExT-light, we present a method to partially emulate
the non-transient memory mapping behavior on commodity hard-
ware by retrofitting uncacheable memory mappings. Thus, in Sec-
tion 4.2, we present an open-source proof-of-concept implementa-
tion of ConTExT-light which can already be used and evaluated on
commodity hardware. However, ConTExT-light does not provide
complete security guarantees, as secrets can still be leaked from
registers, line fill buffers, load buffers, and store buffers. ConTExT
inherently protects also against the recent attacks on microarchi-
tectural buffers [56, 66, 67, 80], as ConTExT prevents leakage from
registers—the state of microarchitectural buffers does not matter.
4.1 Hardware Simulation
We simulated ConTExT using the open-source x86-64 emulator
Bochs [43] to get as close as possible to functionally extending
a real x86-64 processor with our features; non-transient memory
mappings (cf. Section 3.1) as well as secret tracking (cf. Section 3.2).
We incorporated hardware and behavioral changes in our ConTExT-
enabled Bochs.
Hardware Changes. To support secret tracking, a few minor
hardware changes are required. Mostly, these are single bits to
track whether a register is non-transient. These bits are required
in every page-table entry, TLB entry, and register. Furthermore, we
introduce additional bits per cache line tominimize the performance
cost of register spills (cf. Section 3.2).
Page-Table Entry. To distinguish non-transient from normal mem-
orymappings, we have tomark everymemorymapping accordingly
in the PTE. For backwards- and future-compatibility, repurposing
one of the ignored bits is the best choice (cf. Section 3.1). If this bit
is set, we treat the memory mapping as a region which may contain
secrets.
Translation Look-aside buffer. For performance reasons, modern
CPUs cache page-table entries in the TLB. Consequently, we need
an additional non-transient bit in the TLB, caching the bit of the
page-table entry. In Bochs, caching of page-table entries is also
implemented as a TLB-like structure allowing the simulated hard-
ware to automatically transfer the added bit from the PTE to the
TLB. Thus, for cached page-table entries, memory accesses use the
cached non-transient bit from the TLB.
Cache. Bochs only implements an instruction cache, but no data
cache which plays a vital role in our design to cache taint informa-
tion (cf. Section 3.2). Hence, we extended Bochs with data cache
emulation by implementing an 8-way (inclusive) last-level cache.
As the exact eviction strategy is unknown [22], we used LRU as
a good approximation as it has been used in Intel CPUs until Ivy
Bridge [22]. In our emulated cache, we added 8 taint bits per cache
line.
Model-Specific Registers. As described in Section 3.2, we added
two new MSRs to Bochs. Accesses to IA32_TAINT are directly
mapped to the taint bits of the registers, allowing the operating
system to read and write all at once. To save the current taint state
on interrupts (Section 3.2.1), we ensure data consistency between
the two MSRs; a write to IA32_TAINT also (atomically) updates
IA32_SHADOW_TAINT. This enables us to implement secure context
switches (cf. Section 3.3).
Behavioral Changes. All behavioral changes are only enabled
if the operating system supports and enables ConTExT using the
corresponding bit in the control register (cf. Section 3.1). However,
taint tracking is enabled unconditionally as it happens implicitly
without additional cost. This applies to all operations which transfer
data from memory to registers or from registers to registers. In our
proof-of-concept implementation, we added the taint tracking to
368 out of 557 instructions implemented in Bochs. If no memory
mapping is marked as non-transient, then no register can be tainted.
Thus, taint tracking simply has no effect if there is no operating
system support.
ConTExT: Leakage-Free Transient Execution
4.2 ConTExT-light
In addition to the hardware emulation for ConTExT, we imple-
mented ConTExT-light (cf. Section 3) for Linux. Our implementa-
tion of ConTExT-light consists of two parts, a kernel module and
a runtime library. For the full ConTExT, we provide a compiler
extension that minimizes performance penalties of register spills.
For the proof of concept, we emulate non-transient memory map-
pings via uncacheable memory mappings. Uncacheable memory
can generally not be accessed inside the transient execution do-
main [14, 47]. Lipp et al. [47] observed the only exception where
memory despite being marked as uncacheable can be read during
transient execution: In the case that an attacker can issue a legiti-
mate load of the target address in parallel on another hyperthread
running on the same physical core as the attack, the memory con-
tent still can be leaked. However, opposed to ConTExT, ConTExT-
light does not protect secrets while they are architecturally stored
in registers of running threads. Thus, the security guarantees of
ConTExT-light still hold in this case.
Kernel Module. We opted to implement the operating-system
changes as a kernel module for compatibility with a wide range
of kernels. The kernel module is responsible for setting up non-
transient memory mappings. As our proof-of-concept implementa-
tion relies on uncacheable memory, we do not retrofit page-table
bits but use the page-attribute table to declare a memory mapping
as uncacheable.
The kernel module provides an interface for the runtime library
(cf. Section 4.2) to set up non-transient memory mappings. This
allows keeping the changes in the kernel space minimal as most
of the logic and parsing can be implemented in user space. The
kernel module ensures that the page-attribute table contains an
uncacheable (UC) entry by reprogramming the page-attribute table
if this is not already the case. If the runtime library requests a map-
ping to be marked non-transient via the kernel-module interface,
the page-table entry is modified to reference the UC entry in the
page-attribute table. Subsequently, the corresponding TLB entry is
flushed.We do not flush all cache lines of the mapping, as this would
incur additional overhead. Thus, the developer (or runtime library)
has to take care that values stored on pages marked as non-transient
are not cached before they are marked as non-transient.
Runtime Library. The runtime library sets up all static and dy-
namic non-transient memory mappings via the kernel-module in-
terface. Our proof-of-concept runtime library supports C and C++
applications and can be included as a single header file. The header
file provides a keyword, nospec, to annotate variables as secrets.
This keyword ensures that the linker allocates the variables in a
dedicated secret section in the ELF binary. Moreover, the header
file registers a constructor function which is executed before the
actual application, to initialize ConTExT at runtime.
When the application starts, the runtime library identifies all
memorymappings in the secret section from the ELF binary. These
memory mappings are then set to non-transient (i.e., uncacheable)
using the kernel module.
The runtime library is only active on application startup and does
not influence the application during runtime. During runtime, it is
only used if the developer requests dynamic non-transient memory.
For this purpose, the runtime library provides a malloc_secure
and free_secure function. These functions mark the allocated
memory immediately as non-transient.
Compiler. For the full ConTExT with hardware support, we also
need compiler support. We extended the LLVM compiler [42] in
version 8.0.0 to not use the stack for local variables, but move them
to a different part of the memory which we refer to as unprotected
stack. The normal stack is marked as non-transient to not leak
temporary variables and function parameters the compiler puts on
the stack. Thus, to reduce the performance impact, we allocate local
variables which are defined by the developer in the unprotected
stack, which is not marked as non-transient.
Our implementation is based on the already existing SafeStack
extension [40]. We modify the heuristics to not move only specific
but all user-defined variables from the non-transient stack to the
unprotected stack (SafeStack in the original extension). Allocations
coming from function parameters and registers spills are put on
the non-transient stack.
5 EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate ConTExT and ConTExT-light with
respect to their security properties and their performance. We eval-
uate ConTExT on our modified Bochs emulator, and ConTExT-light
on a Lenovo T480s (Intel Core i7-8650U, 24GB DRAM) running
Ubuntu 18.04.1 with kernel version 4.15.0.
5.1 Security
We generally assume that the operating system is trusted, as it
handles the non-transient memory mappings. First, we explain how
ConTExT can be used to protect against all transient-execution
attacks, and how current commodity hardware can be retrofitted
to partially emulate ConTExT. Second, we show the limitations of
ConTExT.
5.1.1 Security of ConTExT. The security guarantees of ConTExT
are built on two assumptions: the application developer correctly
annotated all secrets as such, and the application does not actively
leak secrets (e.g., by writing them to memory locations not marked
as non-transient). For the evaluation, we distinguish two cases,
based on whether the secret values are used architecturally in the
application or not while an attacker mounts a transient-execution
attack.
Architecturally Unused Secrets. A secret is architecturally un-
used if the secret is only stored in a non-transient memory region,
i.e., there is no part of the secret which is stored in a register, cache,
or normal memory region. For example, this is the case if the secret
was not used by the time of an attack. However, the application can
also be in such a state although the secret has already been used in
the past. If all traces of the secret in normal memory or the cache
are already overwritten (or evicted), the application returns again
to the state where secrets are architecturally unused.
In this state, an attacker can only target the secret itself and not
an unprotected copy of it. It is clear that such an attack cannot be
successful, as—per-definition—transiently executed code cannot
retrieve the value from a non-transient memory region. Hence,
ConTExT is secure, if its implementation fulfills this property.
Architecturally Used Secrets. If the entire secret, or parts of it,
are stored in a register, cache, or a memory region not marked as
Schwarz et al.
non-transient, the secret is considered architecturally used. In this
case, an attacker can target any unprotected copy of the secret, not
only the original secret stored in the non-transient memory region.
However, an attack fails if the target is marked as secret, e.g., by a
non-transient memory mapping, tainted register, or tainted cache
line.
If a non-transient memory region is loaded into a register, the
register is tainted and, thus, it cannot be targeted. Moreover, the
taint is also applied to the corresponding cache line and TLB entry.
Any register-to-register operation which copies the secret, also
copies the taint. Similarly, an operation which copies the secret
to a non-transient memory region is also secure. Such operations
include, for example, register spills to the stack, temporary storage
of registers in local variables, or secrets as function arguments
(depending on the calling convention). Tainted registers can only
be untainted by destroying their content, i.e., overwriting them
with non-secret values. Overwriting a register with an immediate
or by using an idiom, e.g., e.g., xor rax,rax, generally untaints
the register. Using the rep prefix on arithmetic or logical register
operations preserves the taint.
Thus, registers can not be untainted while containing a secret.
However, over-approximation can lead to more tainted registers
than necessary.
Operationswhich copy the secret to amemory region notmarked
as non-transient could be attacked. However, such operations are
never implicitly generated by the compiler, as the compiler only
uses the stack as temporary memory. Thus, such an operation has
to be explicitly defined by the application developer, which violates
the assumption that the application does not actively leak secrets.
A remaining scenario is the context switch of the application
with used secrets. In such a case, the application is stopped by the
operating system, and the current register content is saved to the
kernel. As the operating system is aware of register taints, and
also considered trusted, it can leverage the taint saving mechanism
described in Section 3.2.1. The registers can again be saved in a non-
transient memory region to prevent transient-execution attacks on
the saved registers. When returning from the kernel, all registers
are first tainted (an over-approximation, as they are restored from
a non-transient stack), but the original taint is restored just before
the end of the context switch. Thus, registers containing secrets
are always tainted and cannot be targeted.
5.1.2 Security Limitations of ConTExT-light. As ConTExT-light is
implemented using uncacheable memory, we evaluated the security
properties of uncacheable memory regarding transient execution.
In our experimental setup, we mark a memory mapping as un-
cacheable using the PAT. Using Flush+Reload, we verified that the
memory mapping is actually uncacheable.
Unfortunately, even with uncacheable mappings, secrets can still
be leaked if the data is already in a register. Similarly, if the data
is currently in the load buffer or store buffer, because of other op-
erations on the processor (e.g., prefetching, speculative execution,
architectural accesses), the data can still be leaked. If the data is in
the line fill buffer, again because of other operations on the proces-
sor, it can also be accessed like in a regular Spectre or Meltdown
attack. Consequently, ConTExT-light does not provide the same
security guarantees as ConTExT. ConTExT inherently protects
against the microarchitectural data sampling attacks [56, 66, 67, 80]
by preventing leakage from registers. The opportunistic and incor-
rect loading of registers from microarchitectural buffers is thus not
a security problem anymore.
5.1.3 Limitations. ConTExT can only be effective if used correctly
by the application developer, i.e., if the developer marks all secrets
as secret and does not actively leak secrets. However, even if used
correctly, there are certain limitations which mostly result from
a trade-off between performance and security. In the following
paragraphs, we point out where application developers must take
care to not accidentally leak secrets.
ConTExT does not support tainting registers which are used
to steer the control flow, e.g., the instruction pointer or the flags
register. Hence, the application developer should be careful to not
introduce higher order leakage through these registers. This is a
sound reasoning because: If the control flow depends on the secret,
the code is inherently not side-channel resilient, i.e., other side
channels such as cache attacks can already be used to extract the
secret.
Instructions such as CRC32 might also leak secrets if a secret
value is used as input either directly, or in combination with an
attacker-known value. However, as this is again a secret-dependent
operation, the developer has to ensure that this does not leak any
secrets.
Another responsibility of the developer is that secret values
are not actively copied to memory locations not marked as non-
transient. This cannot be prevented by either the compiler or the
hardware, as it is often necessary, e.g., the tainted output of a crypto
operation (ciphertext) is not secret anymore and can be written to
normal memory.
ConTExT-light. As ConTExT-light is only a partial emulation of
ConTExT, it comes with some limitations compared to ConTExT.
The largest difference to ConTExT is that secrets in registers, the
load buffer, the store buffer, and the line fill buffer are not protected.
Thus, if a secret is in one of these microarchitectural structures, it
remains susceptible to transient-execution attacks.
5.2 Performance
We evaluated the performance of ConTExT-light as a loose upper
bound for the performance overhead of ConTExT. We also evaluate
the performance overhead of ConTExT based on our full-system
emulation in Bochs. The SPECspeed 2017 evaluation for the unpro-
tected stack of ConTExT is performed on an i7-8700K machine and
all other evaluations are performed on an i7-8650U machine. Both
systems run Ubuntu Linux 18.04.1 with kernel 4.15.0.
We evaluated the software implications of our proposed hard-
ware changes using our modified version of Bochs and a modified
Linux kernel, based on kernel version 4.15. For the Linux kernel,
we only had to modify 52 lines in 9 files to support the save and
restore of register taints on context switches. These small changes
result in a negligible performance overhead on context switches,
e.g., for syscalls.
The latency of syscalls increases by a constant value, which is
48 cycles (averaged over 500 000 syscall invocations). On a stan-
dard Ubuntu Linux installation we observed between 3000 and
5000 syscalls per second on average while performing regular office
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Benchmark SPEC Score OverheadBaseline ConTExT [%]
600.perlbench_s 7.03 6.86 +2.42
602.gcc_s 11.90 11.80 +0.84
605.mcf_s 9.06 9.16 −1.10
620.omnetpp_s 5.07 4.81 +5.13
623.xalancbmk_s 6.06 5.95 +1.82
625.x264_s 9.25 9.25 0.00
631.deepsjeng_s 5.26 5.22 +0.76
641.leela_s 4.71 4.64 +1.48
648.exchange2_s would require Fortran runtime
657.xz_s 12.10 12.10 0.00
Average +1.26
Table 2: Performance evaluation of the unprotected stack
of ConTExT using the SPECspeed 2017 integer benchmark.
The baseline was compiled with the unmodified compiler,
the ConTExT run uses our modified LLVM compiler.
tasks. On our test system, we observe an overhead on the system
load of around 0.01 % at this syscall rate. The highest syscall rates
observed for real-world use cases at Netflix, was reported to be
around 50 000 syscalls per second [20]. On our test system, we ob-
serve an overhead on the system load of around 0.13 % at this syscall
rate.
Compiler Extension. We evaluated the impact of the unpro-
tected stack of ConTExT using the SPECspeed 2017 integer bench-
mark [13]. Table 2 shows that similarly to the original SafeStack
implementation [40], the resulting performance overhead is 1.26 %
on average and in the worst case 5.13 %.
These results are not surprising, as only addresses of variables
change. This only requires very little runtime code for maintaining
a second stack pointer. Thus, the small performance overhead is
mostly due to the setup time for the additional non-transient stack.
We furthermore evaluated the performance impact introduced
by the non-transient stack. As a baseline we consider the case where
we only have one non-transient stack and compare it to our design
where the non-transient stack is only an additional stack to the
regular unprotected one. Based on Intel Pin [49], we implemented
our own plugin to trace all memory accesses. With the plugin, we
evaluated howmuchmemory the non-transient stack consumes. For
this purpose we ran the GNU Core Utilities, once compiled with the
unmodified compiler, and once compiled with our extended LLVM
compiler. Even for these lightweight applications, we measured a
reduction of average non-transient stack memory by 42.74 %. The
modified LLVM compiler sustained an average non-transient stack
usage of 4.7 kB, whereas the applications compiled with a vanilla
compiler consumed on average 8.2 kB on the single non-transient
stack. Moreover, for 64 out of the 91 tested applications (i.e., 70.3 %),
the compiler extension reduced the non-transient stack usage to
only 3528 B, which is below the smallest memory region that can
be set non-transient, i.e., the size of one virtual page (4 kB). The
reason for these reductions is that the stack is not used anymore for
storing user-defined variables. Hence, the compiler extensionmakes
it practical to deploy ConTExT with the additional non-transient
stack.
ConTExT-light. Weevaluated the performance impact of ConTExT-
light, both for unmodified applications as well as applications where
we annotate secret values as such. For unmodified applications, we
do not expect any runtime overhead, except for a constant initial-
ization overhead.
We confirmed this assumption experimentally. The average ini-
tialization overhead when starting an application with our current
non-optimized implementation is 0.15ms.
For applications with annotated secret values, there is a perfor-
mance overhead for architectural accesses to the secret. Without
ConTExT-light, the secret could be stored in L1, L2, or L3 cache, or
in the main memory. Hence, the maximum overhead for a memory
access is the difference between an L1 cache hit and a cache miss.
The minimum overhead for a memory access is zero (i.e., cache
miss in both cases). In practice we often see a cache miss instead
of an L3 cache hit, which makes an average overhead of 100 cycles
on our test system. We evaluated the performance by encrypting a
message using OpenSSL’s RSA. We verified that indeed all memory
allocations in OpenSSL use the secure functions using ltrace and
single-stepping. The performance overhead we measured when
annotating all buffers that may (temporarily) contain secrets in an
RSA encryption is 71.14 % (± 4.66 %, n = 10 000). This is not surpris-
ing as RSA performs many in-place operations in one secure buffer,
and hence, higher overheads are expected. However, this overhead
is in the same range as the overhead of the recommendedmitigation
strategy for Spectre-PHT attacks alone, i.e., 62–74.8 % for serializa-
tion barriers [9]. Aditional overheads are caused by Spectre-BTB
mitigations, e.g., STIBP (30–50 %) [41] and IBRS (20–30 %) [76], as
well as mitigations for other Spectre and Meltdown variants. Hence,
ConTExT is a viable alternative as its overhead are inherently lower
than the ones we observe with ConTExT-light, and ConTExT-light
already is in the range of state-of-the-art mitigation approaches.
ConTExT improves the performance of ConTExT-light by regu-
lar caching and by hiding the latency of register loads, hence, the
performance will be significantly higher.
6 DISCUSSION
ConTExT is not a defense for commodity systems. ConTExT re-
quires changes across all layers. Yet, compared to all other defenses,
it is the first proposal to achieve complete protection [8, 55]. Con-
current to our work NVIDIA patented a similar idea [7] However,
they focus solely on the protection of memory locations, i.e., not
speculating on memory that might contain secrets. In contrast to
their work, we do provide protection on a register-level, allowing
speculatively cache and register fills. This clearly has a lower perfor-
mance impact. However, the various patents in this area [7, 33, 44]
give us additional confidence of the practicality of our approach.
Naturally, ConTExT is particularly interesting in cases where
isolation is not clear, e.g., to protect a sandbox environment from
the sandboxed code. There are different ways to select what are
secrets to protect. One extreme would be to generally mark all data
secret. As this is not practical related works either restrict it to an
architecturally already defined group, or let the user annotate se-
crets. Taram et al. [73] defined all userspace memory and user input
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as secret. However, this can be very expensive, and consequently,
Yu et al. [90] proposed a less expensive annotation-based protection
mechanism. While this is an important discussion it is orthogonal
to this work. Our work shows that if we can mark secrets, we can
provide complete protection. From a problem which is, according
to Mcilroy et al. [53], currently not solvable in software, ConTExT
shifts the landscape such that the problem is not easy to solve, but
solvable in software.
Dealing with Edge Cases. As we described in Section 5.1.3, Con-
TExT does not support tainting registers which are used to steer
the control flow, e.g., the instruction pointer or the flags register.
If the control flow depends on the secret, the code is inherently
not side-channel resilient, i.e., other side channels such as cache
attacks can already be used to extract the secret. Hence, we consider
only cases where the secret is not leaked via the control flow. In
this case, the commonality of all remaining transient-execution
attacks is that the secret moves through a register. ConTExT does
not prevent any operations from loading data into registers, but it
prevents values from being passed on from tainted registers.
There are many elements in a processor that generally could leak
data such that a register contains a secret. No matter whether the
data was leaked from—the memory, the cache, the line fill buffer,
the load buffer, the store buffer, or just another register—if the
register is tainted, ConTExT does not execute any operation that
depends the value from that register. Hence, under the assumption
that the secret has to move through a register (or already be in
a register), the protection ConTExT provides is complete. Only
violating this assumption would allow bypassing ConTExT. To the
best of our knowledge there is no mechanism on x86-64 that would
allow performing e.g., an indexed array access without loading the
index into a register. This supports our assumption.
As ConTExT prevents the value from being passed on from the
tainted register, we do not have any edge cases around the various
microarchitectural elements.
Microcode. ConTExT likely cannot be implemented (efficiently)
in microcode or microcode updates. The reason is that the behavior
in the critical path when forwarding a value from a register to a
dependent instruction has to be modified. To the best of our knowl-
edge, there is no microcode involved in this part for performance
reasons.
Virtualization. Our approach is oblivious to virtualization. EPTs
equally contain non-transient bits. Identical to the way several other
page table bits are combined (e.g., the non-executable bit), if any bit
in the hierarchy is set to non-transient, the page is non-transient.
Naturally, the extensions we implemented on the operating system
level would have to be identically implemented on the hypervisor
level. We leave this implementation effort for future work.
Implementation of the Microarchitectural Changes. While a
microarchitectural implementation would be interesting, this is not
necessary to see the practicality of our work. We already have the
uncacheable memory mapping which are marked in the page table.
Uncacheable memory is not used during speculative execution,
although if it is already in a cache, line fill buffer, load buffer, or
store buffer, it might be leaked. Hence, there is already a mechanism
in current processors which is very similar to the one we propose.
While uncacheable memory is much slower than what we propose,
it clearly shows that an implementation is possible.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented ConTExT, a technique to effectively
and efficiently prevent the leakage of secrets during transient exe-
cution. The basic idea of ConTExT is to transform Spectre from a
problem that cannot be solved purely in software [53], to a prob-
lem that is not easy to solve, but solvable in software. For this,
ConTExT requires minimal modifications of applications, compil-
ers, operating systems, and the hardware. We implemented these
in applications, compilers, and operating systems, as well as in a
processor simulator.
Mitigating all transient execution attacks with a principled ap-
proach of course costs performance. We provide an approximate
proof-of-concept for ConTExT which we use on commodity sys-
tems to obtain a loose upper bound for the performance overhead.
As seen in our security evaluation, ConTExT is a first proposal for
a principled defense tackling the root cause of transient execution
attacks. ConTExT has no performance overhead for regular appli-
cations and even with the over-approximation of ConTExT-light,
71.14 % for security-critical applications, which below the combined
overhead of recommended state-of-the-art mitigation strategies.
The overhead with ConTExT is below 1 % for most real-world work-
loads. Our work shows that transient execution can be made secure
while maintaining a high system performance.
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